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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study is to estimate the optimal debt threshold of Real Estate Investment Trusts in Malaysia (MREITs). This 
study uses continuous sequential threshold regression approach adopted from Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) and Perron 
(2006) methodologies and collaborates the threshold regression by Hansen (2001; 2015) to estimate the MREITs optimal 
debt threshold. In this regard, although by regulation, MREITs are allowed to use debt up to 50% of their total assets, the 
result of this study indicates that MREITs need to maintain a debt level of between 14.33% and 21.40%, to balance the 
external funding needs and the optimal level of financial performance. Given the high dividend payout requirement, and the 
marginal tax rate of zero, if debt is chosen as the dominant approach of obtaining external financing needs, MREITs need 
to carefully monitor the optimal level of debt in order to maximize the shareholders return and to avoid debt overhang 
problem. The finding offers a useful guide to MREITs managers in strategizing their financing decision to support their 
external growth needs by investing in real property. 
 
Keywords: Real Estate Investment Trusts; Malaysia; threshold; optimal debt; financial performance 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk menentukan nilai ufuk pembiayaan hutang yang optimum bagi Pelaburan Dana Amanah 
Hartanah di Malaysia (MREITs). Kajian ini menggunakan pendekatan regresi nilai ufuk jujukan berterusan oleh Bai dan 
Perron (1998; 2003) serta Perron (2006), juga koloborasi regresi nilai ufuk oleh Hansen (2001; 2015) untuk 
menganggarkan nilai ufuk hutang yang optimum bagi M-REIT. Meskipun peraturan membenarkan M-REIT menggunakan 
hutang sehingga 50% daripada jumlah aset mereka, dapatan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa M-REIT perlu mengekalkan 
paras hutangnya pada kadar 14.33% dan 21.40%, bagi mengimbangi keperluan kepada pembiayaan luar dan prestasi 
kewangan yang optimum. Memandangkan terdapat keperluan untuk membayar dividen yang tinggi serta kadar cukai sut 
sifar, sekiranya hutang dipilih sebagai pendekatan yang dominan bagi mendapatkan pembiayaan luar, M-REIT perlu 
mengawasi kadar optimum hutang tersebut bagi memaksimumkan pulangan pemegang saham serta mengelakkan masalah 
juntaian hutang. Dapatan kajian ini memberi panduan berguna kepada pengurus-pengurus M-REIT dalam mengatur 
strategi dan membuat keputusan pembiayaan yang menyokong keperluan pertumbuhan luar bagi organisasi mereka dalam 
pelaburan harta tanah. 
 
Kata Kunci: Pelaburan Dana Amanah Hartanah; Malaysia; nilai ufuk; hutang optimum; prestasi kewangan  
 
 
 
 
 
74                    Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 51(2), 2017 73-85 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The global financial crisis in September 2007 has drawn attention to the severe risks of overloaded credit expansion on the 
financial performance of the firms and economics. Numerous empirical studies have attempted to investigate the asymmetric 
non-linear relationship between debt and financial performance either at the national or firm level. Using data from 87 
developed and developing countries, Law and Singh (2014) revealed that the use of debt by the public sectors above 88% of 
GDP slows down the economic growth. Similarly, Abd Halim and Nur Adiana Hiau (2013) examined the optimal debt level 
of 467 Malaysian listed firms for the study period from 2005 to 2009, found the use of debt above the optimal debt level of 
64% adversely affects Malaysian firms’ financial performance. Other studies with a similar objective include Cheng et al. 
(2010), Cuong and Canh (2012), Dang et al. (2012) and Alaabed and Masih (2016). Unlike previous studies that focus on 
public listed firms, this study aims to determine the optimal debt threshold of Real Estate Investment Trusts in Malaysia 
(MREITs). In this light, REIT’s business structure differs from other typical listed firms, particularly in Malaysia. 
MREITs, under the current regulation, must distribute 90% or more of their income in the form of dividends to maintain 
a tax-exempt status. This unique business structure indicates that MREITs have limited internal funding to support their 
investment growth needs and do not enjoy any tax shield benefit for interest payment from the use of debt if they choose 
debt as a source of fund. Furthermore, leverage ratio for MREITs is restricted to 50% of its total assets. As put forth by 
Hardin and Wu (2010), Ghosh et al. (2010) and Ghosh and Sun (2014), REITs are known as business entities with constraints 
in cash flow retention and liquidity and requires high external capital in order to grow. The evidence shows that REITs in 
the western countries use debt to support their growth and optional for liquidity (Chan et al. 2003; Campbell et al. 2008; 
Riddiough & Wu 2009; Hardin & Wu 2010; Giambona 2014). A study by Feng et al. (2007) examined the puzzling 
borrowing pattern of REITs in the United States, where the use of debt by REITs is more than 50% at the IPO and increases 
gradually to 65% during the 10-year period. In the context of MREITs, the use of debt during 2005 to 2014 ranged from 
12.5% to 50% (see Exhibit I). This shows that some of the MREITs utilize almost the maximum statutory asset gearing 
limits at 50% of their total asset value which will limit their new debt capacity for new acquisition opportunity. It would be 
essential for MREITs to ensure that their debt level does not exceed the certain limit that may harm their financial 
performance as this element is important to ensure the future success of MREITs sustainability. This is due to the fact that 
REITs’ underlying assets heavily rely on real property and their performance is directly influenced by the strong cyclical 
behavior of the property market (Chan et al. 2003; Ong et al. 2012). REITs are also known to have high levels of fixed 
operating costs. Thus, having higher financial leverage together with the higher levels of fixed operating leverage can 
substantially increase the influence of declining markets on net earnings and cash flows available to the shareholders will be 
more volatile (Chan et al. 2003). Moreover, the use of debt for REITs, which are tax-exampt entity, are more expensive than 
taxed firms (Howe & Shilling 1988; Maris & Elayan 1990). 
This study uses a recent empirical approach to estimate the debt threshold value of MREITs. The estimation approach of 
optimal debt uses the continuous sequential approach of threshold regression method and adopts the methodologies presented 
in Bai and Perron (2003), Perron (2006), and Hansen (2001; 2015). This approach estimates the unknown threshold value 
directly and does not require the bootstrapping testing procedure to identify the number of thresholds and takes care the issue 
of heterogeneity. Furthermore, most of the REITs literatures analyse the puzzle of why REITs use debt despite no tax shield 
benefit and the adverse effect of using debt, but no attempt to determine the optimal debt threshold above which  destroy 
REITs’ financial performance. As such, this study contributes to the REITs literature by estimating the optimal debt threshold 
value for REITs in Malaysia, while simultaneously controlling other factors that affect the MREIT’s financial performance, 
such as liquidity, financial flexibility, size, dividend payout, cash flow volatility and growth in investment. Equally important, 
The finding of this study can be used as a benchmark for REITs particularly REITs in Malaysia to identify the level of debt 
that provides an optimal financial performance. Therefore, this study deserves special attention. 
The data were analysed through employing panel threshold regression model for all MREITs samples from 2005 to 2014 
to confirm the existence of a non-linear relationship between debt and financial performance and identify the threshold of 
optimal debt that optimizes the financial performance of MREITs. A striking conclusion that emerges from the finding is 
that debt is positively related to financial performance when it is within the identified optimal debt threshold values. In this 
study, the optimal debt threshold value for MREITs is between 14.33% and 21.40%, hence, further increase in the debt away 
from its identified threshold (optimal regime) will impair the financial performance of MREITs. Important to realize that the 
optimal debt threshold for MREITs are lower than those of the taxable firms. This compares to the optimal debt threshold 
value of 64.33% for Malaysian listed firms (taxable firms) referenced study by Abd Halim and Nur Adiana Hiau (2013). 
Thus, MREITs need to balance the risk of having a high debt level to finance the investment growth needs and the high 
return on the investment by having an optimal or right composition of debt level. Consequently, MREITs need to focus on 
the optimal level of leverage and only accept risk when the odds of success are high. 
The other sections in this study are organized as follows, Section 2 consecutively discusses the theoretical background 
and presents a literature review on REITs debt financing, Section 3 discusses the methodology and data description of this 
study, Section 4 highlights the estimation results and finally, Section 5 provides recommendation and conclusion.  
 
 
75                    Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 51(2), 2017 73-85 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Being an entity with a marginal tax rate of zero, many are concerned on what considerations should guide MREITs in 
deciding its debt level. The query of what is the optimal debt level for MREITs could be responded in different ways through 
theories of capital structure such as trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger 1973) and debt overhang theory (Myers 1977). 
The trade-off theory provides the notion that the optimal debt level derives at the point where the benefit of using debt on 
tax saving is equal to the direct and indirect bankruptcy cost. The concern is that for the REITs industry, the tax shield benefit 
is less relevant for tax-exempt industry (Harrison et al. 2011). As there is no tax saving on the debt usage for MREITs, the 
obvious implication is that the use of debt financing may reduce their financial performance (such as earnings) more than 
tax-paying firms. This will increase the risk of potential reduction in the future earnings available to the shareholders. Too 
much debt can be a cause of the underinvestment problem associated with free cash flows. Specifically, when a firm has 
what as Myer (1977) calls a “debt overhang”, where a firm has high debt burden in its capital structure and this limits them 
to undertake future profitable investment growth. In the meantime, according to Myer (1977), “debt overhang” can be 
reduced if firms use a short-term debt maturity. The rationale is that the new investment decision can be made immediately 
when the debt matures and firm’s value is less sensitive to the short-term debt. However, Diamond and He (2014) suggested 
that short-term debts can create debt overhang where debt may expose firm to default earlier. Short-term borrowing needs 
to be paid during the short-term intervals, and if the credit market freezes especially during the downturn period, this may 
lead to a severe problem of default payment. 
An increase in debt ratio may have an adverse effect on the financial performance of REITs, and this effect will continue 
to worsen during the economic downturn. Oppenheimer (2000) analyzed the debt levels of REITs in the United States (U.S.), 
and the ability to pay the debt financing cost, as well as dividend payment in the period from 1994 to1998, and suggests that 
an extensive increase in the debt has led to a substantial reduction in the dividend payout ratio and interest coverage ratios. 
In addition, a recent study by Titman et al. (2014) concluded that excessive leverage and shorter maturity debt in REITs’ 
capital structure contribute to higher exposure to financial distress and subsequently enlarging the decline of REITs’ share 
price, especially during the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009. This situation has forced REITs to forgo their existing 
real property asset at unattractive term in order to survive. Titman et al. further concluded that REITs with higher debt ratios 
during the crisis are still struggling to rebound and the share value is still trading below the pre-crisis highs. Similarly, the 
recent study by  Zalina et al.(2017) also show that debt financing is negatively associated with MREITs’ financial 
performance.  The use of debt by MREITs has increased a burden of interest cost, which pulled down its net return. Relatedly, 
Dimitrov and Jain (2008), Cai and Zhang 2011), and Diamond and He (2014) perform studies within a non-REITs industry 
also conclude that an increase in leverage ratio is likely to harm firm’s future cash flow and investment. Dimitrov and Jain 
(2008) and Chung et al. (2013) demonstrated that an increase in debt level gives an indication of poor performance as the 
firms tend to increase their borrowing level when they experience deterioration in their operating performance.  
Meanwhile, a study on non-REITs in emerging country, for example Malaysia, found a negative relationship 
between debt ratios and firm financial performance. The study by Salim and Yadav (2012) used a sample of 237 Malaysian 
listed companies from 1995 to 2011. Other studies on emerging countries which focused on the similar issue are Ebaid 
(2009) and, Zeitun and Tian (2007), both concluded that debt financing has a negative impact on firm performance. However, 
empirical evidence presented in Abor (2005) on listed firms in Ghana showed that firms with a high number of short-term 
debts have higher profitability. Previous studies have also shown that there are other factors that affect firm’s financial 
performance, such as liquidity, financial flexibility, size, dividend payment, cash flow volatility and growth in investment. 
With regard to liquidity, previous studies indicates that liquidity provides positive effect to firm’s financial performance. 
For instance,  Moyer et al. (2001) indicated that having higher liquid asset may enhance firm performance and business 
survival. Firms that have sufficient liquid funds are views to have more opportunity that will give direct effect to the firm 
performance. The reason is that firms with ample cash reserves permit them to fund their potential valuable investment and 
operation needs at less expensive than both debt and common equity financing (Opler et al. 1999; Faulkender & Wang 
(2006). Comparably, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) concludes that holding large cash do facilitate firm to undertake profitable 
investment without threatening firm performance.  
Similarly, Marchica and Mura (2010) provided an evidence states that companies which are managed conservative debt 
policy will allow them to maintain financial flexibility and directed to have more ability to take any opportunity in investment 
if it arises in the future. Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) showed that firms with substantial cash and adopt leverage policy 
conservatively will have better performance as they are able to take investment opportunity when the time of needs. A recent 
study by Zalina et al. (2017) found that financial flexibility acts as an important factor that able to adjust the relationship 
between debt financing and financial performance from negative to positive relationship of MREITs. Overall, financial 
flexibility play as an important element for firm performance and sustainability (Arslan-Ayaydin et al. 2014; Byoun 2011; 
Childs et al. 2005; DeAngelo & DeAngelo 2007; Gamba & Triantis 2008; Lins et al. 2010; Mikkelson & Partch 2003; Moyer 
et al. 2001).  
Previous finance literature has also claimed that the size of a firm has an impact on firm’s performance, specifically, 
its profitability. Larger firms are seen to be cost efficient because they are able to apportion their fixed expenditures for more 
ventures or projects. This is known as the benefit of economies of scales. Large firms may also have greater revenue as they 
have the greater market power which enables them to possibly control the market in term of raising market price of services 
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and goods. Studies on REITs by Ambrose and Linneman (2001) and Ambrose et al. (2005) suggested larger REITs incline 
to have greater profit. It was revealed larger REITs gain greater profit margin and greater rental revenue and have lesser 
indirect capitalization rates than smaller REITs. Recent evidence that supports the findings of these two studies was presented 
in Ertugrul & Giambona (2010) which also reported that larger REITs gain more profit. Moreover,  Ross et al. (2016) and 
Kanwal and Hameed (2017) posited that dividend payout determines firm’s performance as high dividend payment translates 
into high firm’s performance. It also reflects the firm’s capacity to generate profits from the business and to distribute 
available funds to its shareholders.  
 Another important factor that affect firm’s financial performance is cash flow volatility. Trueman and Titman 
(1988) denoted that cash flow and earnings stability reduces a firm's default. Froot, David and Stein (1993) provide empirical 
evidence that volatility in firm’s cash flows could reduce a firm’s value it has to forgo positive-NPV projects due to limitation 
in obtaining financing. In contrast, Chi and Su (2017) showed the positive relationship between cash flow volatility and firm 
performance have particularly for small (young) with higher growth opportunities thus, cash flow volatility affects the firm’s 
financial performance. Growth in investment is reported to have an effect to firm’s performance.  Lipson, Mortal and Schill 
(2011) and Fama and French (2006) observed that firms experiencing high asset growth have higher stock return and tend 
to experience high accounting performance prior to the occurrences of growth. Thus, this suggests that growth affects the 
firm’s financial performance.  
 In the meantime, it should be noted that most empirical evidences revolve around a central question on debt-
financial performance relationship and the determinant factors of firm financial performance, however, past literature 
including past REITs studies have rarely described the debt threshold systematically, particularly, on which level of debt 
provides optimal firm financial performance. Meanwhile, other studies that considered the optimal level of debt and firm 
performance for non REITs entity are Abd. Halim and Nur Adiana (2013); Cheng et al. (2010), Coricelli et al. (2012). Cheng 
et al. (2010) examined the optimal debt at which point maximize the firm value using data from 650 Chinese listed during 
the period from 2001 to 2006. Cheng et al. conclude that the firm value starts to diminish when the debt ratio is 53.97% and 
its deteriorate when the debt ratio reach to 75.26%. The relationship between debt and firm value is found to be an inverted 
U-shape. Using a larger set of sample from sixteen transition countries over the period 1999 to 2008, Coricelli et al. (2012), 
found the lower threshold value is 33.6% and the upper threshold value is 38.6%. The study was carried out among the 
manufacturing firms from the countries, namely Ukraine, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Russia, Croatia, 
Estonia, Republic of Moldova, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Serbia, Latvia, Slovenia and 
Lithuania. While Abd. Halim and Nur Adiana (2013), with the similar objective to examine the optimal threshold level of 
debt at which point maximize firm value among 467 Malaysian listed firms (excluding REITs, financial institution, and 
insurance industry) for the study period from 2005 to 2009 and found the threshold limit above which destroy the Malaysian 
firm value is 64.33%. It may be noticed that different empirical studies carried out in the different country provide a different 
optimal level of debt at which point can maximize the firm value. This might be due to the differences in institutional 
structure, legal system and tax policies (Wald 1999).  
Therefore, this research attempts to identify the optimal threshold of MREITs’ debt, being an entity with a marginal tax 
rate of zero. This will enable MREITs’ managers to improve their financing decision and financial performance, and also 
allows them to monitor their debt financing level so as not to destroy their financial performances while maintaining a 
sufficient amount of liquid capital.  
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study examines the data set which consists of financial information and accounting data of all sixteen (16) MREITs 
publicly traded in Bursa Malaysia for the 10-year period from the inception in January 2005 to December 2014. The study 
makes an effort to cover the whole MREITs. The study time frame lies between 2005 to 2014 is because MREITs was only 
introduced in 2005. The data in this study are based on secondary data which are extracted from the annual report of each 
MREITs published in the Bursa Malaysia and Datastream International.  
This study uses the threshold regression model developed by Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) and Perron (2006) as a 
baseline to assess the issue of balancing the cost and benefit of using debt. The threshold regression model applied in this 
study provides an approach to assess the heterogeneous relationship between the debt and financial performance in 
identifying the optimal debt threshold of MREITs, relative to the conventional threshold regression model. The model allows 
this study to obtain the threshold estimation value for the unknown threshold. It is important to remark that this study 
collaborates Perron (2006) and Bai and Perron (2003) threshold regression specification models. The framework for the 
threshold estimation is based on the fundamental of breakpoint model introduced by Bai and Perron (2003) and Perron 
(2006) to estimate the unknown threshold. Hansen (2015) newest edition of his threshold regression model acknowledges a 
similar assumption. This threshold regression model is referred to as the “regression kink model” with an unknown threshold. 
According to Hansen (2015), most of the previous literature use the discontinuous threshold regression method with the 
assumption that the threshold is known, and further commented that the implementation of multiplier bootstrapping method, 
as recommended by Hansen (1999) to resolve the “Davies” problem (see Davies 1987) does not explain the observation of 
time-series nature which is expected to express certain finite sample distortion. Thus, to overcome this shortfall, the Bai-
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Perron Sup-F test statistics was used in this study to estimate the optimal debt threshold value by adapting the methodologies 
of Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) and Perron (2006). The approach does not require the bootstrapping testing procedure to 
identify the number of thresholds, indeed, it applies continuous sequentially estimation. The construction of the optimal debt 
threshold model is explained in the following section of this study. The construction of the threshold model is explained 
below. 
 
VARIABLES 
 
This study uses return on invested asset (ROIA) to represent MREITs financial performance. The measurement for ROIA is 
net fund from operation (FFO) to total net assets, where net FFO is defined as net realised earnings plus depreciation and 
amortization minus gains on sales of property or any extraordinary items. In this light, most REIT studies used FFO rather 
than earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) or earning after tax (EAT) as the key indicator of REITs' operating profit as 
FFO provides a more useful information on the operating performance measure than net earnings for the REITs industry 
(Harrison et al. 2011). The data comprise of the unbalanced panel data and the debt ratio (total debt to total net assets) is the 
threshold variable. Debt refers to bank loan or interest bearing debt. On the other hand, this study excludes accruals, trade 
credit (accounts payable) which includes fixed term loans, revolving credits and commercial papers and non-interest bearing 
liabilities, such as accruals and trade credit (accounts payable) and intercompany loan or parent companies. The threshold 
variable is considered as the main variable in examining whether there is a threshold of optimal debt above which threatens 
the financial performance of MREITs.  
This research used six control variables that commonly influence the firm’s financial performance. The control variables 
are the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total net assets (liquidity) to measure the liquidity of MREITs, cash flow volatility 
(risk), the cash flow volatility is measured by standard deviation of funds from operations (FFO) scaled by the total net asset 
over the year to measure the potential risk of the MREITs’ cash flow, growth (based on the percentage at which MREITs is 
growing and measured as the annual percentage changes in the total market value of property investment), the log of total 
tangible assets as a measure for MREITs’ size. Meanwhile, dividend payout (Dividend) was measured as total annual 
dividend payment scaled by the total net asset. To measure financial flexibility (FF), this research constructed an index 
multiplying the ranks of liquidity (the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total net assets) and debt ratio of all MREITs 
samples over the study period from 2005 to 2014. This is inspired by Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) in which the financial 
flexibility can be attained through the combination of higher cash holding and lower debt ratio. To obtain the financial 
flexibility score, first, this research ranked the cash holding ratio of all MREITs over the study period in a descending order. 
The highest cash holding ratio was assigned as the highest score in the ranking. Second, the debt ratio was ranked for all 
MREITs over the study period in an ascending order which indicates the lowest debt ratio is assigned as the highest score in 
the ranking. The product of the two scores is the quantified financial flexibility, where higher value indicates higher financial 
flexibility. This value was used as a proxy to measure the financial flexibility in the regression analysis. 
As the data in this research comprised of the panel data series, it is necessary to perform a panel unit root test to confirm 
that the variables are stationary. This test was performed to examine the null hypotheses of a unit root. Therefore, to test for 
panel unit root of all the defined variables in the model for all MREITs samples, this research employs the panel unit root 
test of Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller 1979). Once this 
condition was met, the single debt threshold for two-regime model equation was estimated using Bai and Perron (1998; 
2003) and Perron (2006) threshold regression specification. This is expressed as follows: 
 
The observation for regime j= 0, 1….m, the standard linear regression specification is presented as:  
 
Vit = µi + 𝜃' hit + α1 dit + ε i,t                (1) 
 
While the specification for single threshold, two-regime model is presented as:  
 
           µi + 𝜃' hit + α1 dit + ε i,t       if  ∞ < dit < γ1 
Vit =                                                                       (2) 
             µi + 𝜃' hit + α2 dit + ε i,t          if  γ1 ≤ dit < ∞  
 
 
  𝜃 = (𝜃 1, 𝜃 2)ʹ  
 
  hit = ( Lit ,FFit)ʹ  
 
 Vit represents the MREITs’ financial performance measured by ROIA. The debt ratio is the explanatory variable and 
the threshold variable denoted as dit. It is important to note that d, which is debt ratio, has the coefficients that specify the 
regime in which the regressors are split into two or more regime. γ1, represents the identifiable estimated threshold value. hit 
represents control variables that may influence the MREITs’ financial performance. The assumption is that the control 
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variables are the variables that have similar parameters across the regimes. The six control variables are Liquidityit; Cash 
flow volatilityit; Growth in investment (Growth)it; Sizeit; Dividendit; and Financial Flexibilityit. Meanwhile, 𝜃1, and 𝜃2 
represent the coefficients estimate of control variables. µi is a given fixed effect that is treated to control heterogeneity of 
MREITs. i represents a cross section of MREITs and t represents periods in this stud, while α1 is the coefficient for dit (debt 
ratio) if the value of the observable threshold variable is lesser than γ1; α2 is the coefficient for dit (debt ratio) if the value of 
the observable threshold is greater than γ1. It is assumed that there is an observable threshold variable dit and the threshold 
value is strictly increasing  (γ1 <γ2 < ……γm), thus it is present in regime j if γj≤ dit γj+1, where it is set as γ0 = ∞ andγm+1 = ∞. 
Lastly, the error εi,t is assumed to be normally distributed 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑(0, σ
2 ). 
Based on equation 2, the optimal debt threshold regression analysis is divided into two regimes. The first regime is when 
the debt ratio (dit) is less than the estimated identified threshold value (γ1). Thus, the threshold value falls in the lower debt 
regime (∞ <dit<γ1). The second regime (γ1 ≤ dit< ∞) is when the debt (dit) is greater than the estimated identified threshold 
value (γ1) and it is considered to be in the upper debt regime. The regimes are set apart based on the diversity of regression 
slope, which are α1 and α2. Here, the known variables of Vit,dit , hit were used to estimate the unknown parameters- γ, α , 𝜃and 
σ2. 
Once the threshold value of γ1 has been determined, for example, α1≠ α2, a confidence interval can be formed for the 
estimated identified threshold value of γ1. This study hypothesizes that there is a non-linear relationship between debt ratio 
and MREITs financial performance. As such, it is vital to test the following null hypothesis in order to investigate whether 
the estimated threshold value is statistically significant. The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are represented as 
follows: 
 
 H0 :  α1 = α2 
H1 :  α1 ≠ α2 
 
When the null hypothesis holds, the coefficient α1 = α2 indicates that the estimation of threshold does not occur in the 
relationship between the debt ratio and MREITs’ financial performance. Whereas, when the alternative hypothesis holds, 
the coefficient α1 ≠ α2 indicates that the estimation of threshold does occur in the relationship between the debt ratio and 
financial performance of MREITs. Hansen (1999) suggested the use of an F-test to determine the threshold value and Sup-
Wald statistic to examine the null hypothesis. Furthermore, Hansen (1999) suggested a ‘bootstrap’ procedure to estimate the 
testing statistic asymptotic distribution to resolve the “Davies” problem. However, it is important to note that this study 
applied the estimation of the threshold value adopting the methodologies of Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) and Perron (2006), 
that based on continuous sequential breakpoints. Giving that in mind, this violates the assumptions for the Sup-F statistics 
(Hansen 1999; Hansen 2000). Hence, the fixed regressor bootstrap testing as proposed by Hansen (1999) is not applicable 
to identify the thresholds.  
In this study, the optimal debt threshold was estimated sequentially by first, searching the initial threshold value that 
minimizes the sums of squares, and then simultaneously finding the values, based on the obtained initial threshold value that 
minimized the sums of squares until the next possible threshold value is determined. It was performed from number 1 to the 
maximum number until the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The estimation of the parameter of the model is performed 
using the nonlinear least square approach. The nonlinear least square is an accepted approach to estimate the model 
parameter. The estimation of threshold regression was obtained by minimizing the Ѕ (α𝜃, γ) with respect to the parameter. 
The sum-of-squares objective function is illustrated below: 
 
Ѕ(α , 𝜃, γ) = ∑  𝑖𝑡=1 (yt - ht ‘𝜃 - ∑  
𝑚
𝑗=0 1j (d’t , γ) . dt ‘α j )
2                        (3) 
 
In particular, when there is a double threshold, the model equation can be illustrated as:  
 
               μi + 𝜃' hit + α1 dit + ε i,t        if  ∞ < dit < γ1 
 
    Vit =        μi + 𝜃' hit + α2 dit + ε i,t          if  γ1 ≤ dit < γ2 
 
                   μi + 𝜃' hit + α3 dit + ε i,t        if  γ2 ≤ d’it < ∞ 
 
It is notable to mention that this study did not split the bank debt ratio into short term and long term to identify the optimal 
debt level in the study analysis and splitting the pre, during and post financial crisis period. This is because the number of 
the MREITs data is relatively small and this study was unable to perform the analysis due to insufficient data. Furthermore, 
this study only considered the most relevant and crucial explanatory variables in the analysis because the model is considered 
to have little degree of freedom if the number of estimated variables is larger than the number of observations (Baltagi 2011). 
This may cause over-fitting of the model. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULT 
 
This research employed the Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003) and  Augmented Dickey Fuller (Dickey & Fuller 1979) to 
test for panel unit root of all defined variables in the debt threshold model for all MREITs samples. Based on the result of 
panel unit root test, show that the nulls of the unit root are rejected. Thus, it can be confirmed that all variables in the debt 
threshold model are stationary at I(0), indicating that the full analysis of the optimal debt threshold estimation can be 
performed. Table 1 presents the result of the panel unit root test. 
 
TABLE 1. Panel Unit Root Test Result. 
           LLC 
 IPS  ADF-Fisher  
Variables t-statistic 
P-value t-statistic P-Value t-statistic P-value 
 
ROIA -709.874 0.0000 
 
-107.642 0.0000 
 
111.331 0.0000 
Debt ratio  -17.869 0.0000 
-7.2882 
0.0000 
80.998 
0.0000 
Liquidity  -13.447 0.0000 
-5.907 
0.0000 
76.631 
0.0000 
Cash flow volatility -21.831 0.0000 
-10.773 
0.0000 
95.604 
0.0000 
Growth -89.861 0.0000 
-19.890 
0.0000 
96.192 
0.0000 
Size -8.6771 0.0000 
-3.6715 
0.0001 
63.695 
0.0003 
Dividend -28.455 0.0000 
-13.892 
0.0000 
148.425 
0.0000 
Financial flexibility -19.022 0.0000 
-4.6254 
0.0000 
55.125 
0.0034 
   
    
Notes:   
LLC represent the Levin,Lin & Chu (2002), IPS represent Im, Pesaran and Shin(2003), ADF represent the Dickey and Fuller (1979) 
panel unit-root test approach respectively. 
 
Table 2 presents the result of the threshold estimation of total debt ratio and ROIA with six controlling variables which 
are liquidity, cash flow volatility, growth in investment, size, dividend payout, and financial flexibility. 
 
TABLE 2. Threshold Estimation of Total Debt Ratio and ROIA 
Variables  
 
Coefficient SE White t White P-value  
First Regime  
Debt ratio< 14.33 (γ1) 
 
 
 
   
(16 observations) 
 
 
 
 
   
Debt ratio  α1 0.0168 0.0108 1.5584 0.1231 
Liquidity   -0.8836*** 0.1555 -5.6829 0.0000 
Cash flow volatility   3.0354*** 0.6654 4.5621 0.0000 
Growth in investment   -0.0168*** 0.0021 -7.8907 0.0000 
Size   -0.4609 0.2816 -1.6370 0.1056 
Dividend payout   -0.4104*** 0.1431 -2.8684 0.0053 
Financial flexibility   0.0582*** 0.0138 4.2117 0.0001 
C   11.2981 3.7194 3.0376 0.0032 
Second Regime 
14.33(γ1) ≤ Debt ratio< 21.40 (γ2)  
 
   
(15 observations) 
 
 
 
 
   
Debt ratio  α2 0.6019*** 0.1678 3.5872 0.0006 
Liquidity   0.1494** 0.0830 1.7993 0.0757 
Cash flow volatility   0.9914*** 0.3311 2.9940 0.0037 
Growth in investment   0.0118 0.0227 0.5199 0.6046 
Size   0.7108** 0.0820 2.5201 0.0137 
Dividend payout   1.1482*** 0.2978 3.8548 0.0002 
Financial flexibility   -0.0623*** 0.0198 -3.1511 0.0023 
C   -21.0739 5.6014 -3.7622 0.0003 
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Third Regime 
Debt ratio ≥21.40 (γ2)  
(73 observations) 
   
   
    
   
Debt ratio  α3 -0.0256** 0.0102 -2.5005 0.0144 
Liquidity   0.0025 0.0049 0.4992 0.6190 
Cash flow volatility   0.2654** 0.1058 2.5086 0.0141 
Growth in investment   0.0003 0.0031 0.0962 0.9236 
Size   -0.1094 0.0736 -1.4861 0.1412 
Dividend payout   0.4608*** 0.0963 4.7858 0.0000 
Financial flexibility   0.0045 0.0036 1.2446 0.2169 
C   4.5847 1.2608 3.6364 0.0005 
R-squared   0.8584   
F-statistic   21.0865***   
Notes:  
α1 is the estimated coefficient for dit< γ1, α2 is the estimated coefficient for dit γ1 ≤dit<γ2,  α3 is the estimated coefficient 
for dit≥γ2 , SE White is the threshold regression with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariances, t White is the t-statistic, ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Sample 
trimming value is 0.10, confidence interval at 95% level, use continuous sequential determined threshold method 
and number of threshold is 2 to fine tune the optimal threshold result. 
 
The findings illustrated in Table 2 indicate that there are double threshold in the three (3) debt threshold regime obtained 
from the continuous sequential threshold regression analysis. The three regimes, along with the debt threshold value were 
determined based on the sequential threshold regression analysis that minimized the residual sums of squares. In this regard, 
in the regime where the debt ratio is less than 14.33%, the estimated coefficient α1 is 0.0168. However, this relationship is 
insignificant. This indicates that when the debt ratio is less than 14.33%, there is no relationship between debt ratio and 
ROIA of MREITs. This result suggests that MREITs with a ratio lower than 14.33% does not have any impact on the firm’s 
financial performance. Meanwhile, in the regime where the debt ratio is between 14.33% and 21.40%, the estimated 
coefficient α2 is 0.6019, indicating the debt has a positive and significant impact on ROIA. Comparing the results of the two 
estimated coefficients, α1 and α2, it can be observed that when the debt ratio is between 14.33% and 21.40%, ROIA increased 
by 0.60% when the debt ratio increased by 1%. 
However, the negative relationship between debt and ROIA was found when the debt ratio was more than 21.40% with 
a significant estimated coefficient α3 of -0.0256. The marginal effect of debt on ROIA of MREITs changed from positive to 
negative once the debt level exceeded the 21.40% threshold. Taken together, this debt threshold estimated results suggest 
that beyond the debt level of 21.40%, any increase in debt level results in a decrease in ROIA of MREITs. What is interesting 
in this result is that too little debt use in the MREITs capital structure below 14.33% does not bring any impact or relationship 
between debt and financial performance. In the meantime, having too little debt may indicate MREITs’ lack of investment 
growth or indicate poor performance. This tells us that MREITs need to sustain growth in their property investment as this 
will provide higher income yield and increase the overall return on the firm’s invested assets, bearing in mind that the 
threshold limit or the optimal debt threshold for MREITs is between 14.33% and 21.40%. It is also essential to note that 
about 14.70% of MREITs (based on 17 observation falls in the optimal debt regime) reached the optimal debt level of 
between 14.33% and 21.40% during the study period, while 71.56% of MREITs exceeded the financing cost against earnings 
that led to the reduction of financial performance, and 15.68% of MREITs showed a debt level below the estimated optimal 
debt threshold. The finding also suggests that the relationship between debt ratio and financial performance of MREITs is 
asymmetrically nonlinear.  
Noticeably, the debt ratio is not the only element affecting the financial performance of MREITs. As demonstrated in 
Table 2, liquidity, which is used as a control variable in this threshold model, was found to be significantly negatively related 
to ROIA in the regimes with debt below 14.33%. While in the regime with debt ratio above 21.40% the liquidity is not 
related to the ROIA. More importantly, these results provide important insights that when the MREITs are in the optimal 
debt level, which is between 14.33% and 21.40%, liquidity also acts as an influential role in the determinant of financial 
performance. This is consistent with the previous empirical evidence on the important role of on firm financial performance 
as firms with high liquidity may have better financial performance and survival (Moyer et al. 2001). Nevertheless, the result 
indicates that above the optimal debt level, liquidity is less significant in determining the financial performance.  
Furthermore, the study found that cash flow volatility is significantly and positively related to ROIA in all the three 
regimes. The results support the idea of Chi and Su (2017) that there is a small relationship between cash flow volatility and 
firm financial performance in small (young) firms with higher growth opportunities. This seems to match the REITs industry 
in Malaysia which are considered to be relatively young and small compared to the REITs in developed countries like the 
United States where the REITs in the US have been established since 1961. The relationship between growth in investment 
with the variables studied is interesting because it has a negative relationship with financial performance for the first regime 
but no relation with MREITs’ financial performance, in both second and third regime. This indicates high growth in 
investment does not translate to high financial performance. Furthermore, dividend payouts have positive relationship with 
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financial performance in both the second and third regime. This indicates that higher payout dividend translates to higher 
financial performance for the MREITs.  
In regards to the role of financial flexibility as a control variable in this threshold model, the result revealed that financial 
flexibility is positively related to ROIA when the debt ratio is below 14.33%, which is consistent with the previous studies 
and it is negatively related when the debt ratio is above 14.33%. Thus, the obvious finding to emerge from this study is that 
size of MREITs has no relationship with to the firm’s financial performance in the both below and above the optimal debt 
regime. Firm size was found to be positively related to MREITs’ financial performance when the debt ratio is within the 
optimal regime, which is between 14.33% and 21.40%. Thus, this study posits that larger MREITs seem to gain greater 
financial performance if they use debt optimally. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that being a larger MREITs does not 
necessary lead to higher financial performance as they are perceive to be more cost efficient, however, careful attention 
needs to be considered to use debt optimally in order to attain high financial performance. It is notable that regardless of 
their size, MREITs are exposed to bankruptcy risk if their debt level is beyond the optimal level.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The main aim of this study is to find the answer to the lingering questions around REITs, particularly REITs in Malaysia. 
As REITs have no tax shield benefit, it is important to find out what is the optimal debt level for MREITs. The results 
confirm the nonlinear relationship between debt and financial performance and had identified the optimal debt level that 
optimizes the financial performance of MREITs. The finding offers an important insight that the optimal debt level of 
MREITs is between 14.33% and 21.40%. This finding is consistent with the trade-off theory that suggests there is an optimal 
debt usage in which optimal debt usage is determined at the point where any increase in debt level will cause an increase in 
the risk of financial distress more than the advantage received from the tax shield. In the MREITs context, there is no benefit 
of tax shield, thus MREITs need to balance the benefit of using debt to escalate their property investment as this will sustain 
the upward momentum of their income earnings, with the cost of debt financing.   
The study by Abd Halim and Nur Adiana Hiau (2013) found that the optimal debt threshold value of Malaysian listed 
companies (non-REITs) was 64.33% while, in contrast, the optimal debt thresholds in the MREITs context were between 
14.33% and 21.40%. The optimal debt level for MREITs is almost seventy percent (70%) lower than the non-REITs industry, 
which may indicate that for an REITs entity with a zero marginal tax rate, the cost of using debt is relatively higher than 
non-REITs industry. It is important to note that the comparative levels of the costs and benefits of debt vary with firms’ 
characteristics and business framework. This suggests that different firms’ characteristic and business frameworks lead to 
different optimal debt level and that different industries may have different abilities to carry the debt which is determined 
by the volatility of a firm’s cash flows. Moreover, the lower optimal debt level for MREITs relative to non-REITs indicates 
that MREITs is discouraged to use debt because similar to tax-paying firms, MREITs have to pay the similar financing cost 
despite not having tax shield benefit ( Chan et al. 2003; Howe & Shilling 1988). Undoubtedly, it was found that it will be 
costlier for  MREIT entity to fund its growth needs or other operational needs using debt financing. These results are also 
consistent with the debt overhang theory which posits that having too much debt will harm a firm’s performance and most 
likely to increase the debt overhang problem in the firm. Moreover, the results support the findings by Oppenheimer (2000), 
Dimitrov and Jain (2008), and Titman et al. (2014) which showed the adverse effect of using debt on the firm performance.  
In the context of MREITs, the result suggests that based on the high fixed dividend payout requirement and zero 
marginal tax, if debt financing is chosen as the dominant approach of obtaining external financing needs, the MREITs should 
properly monitor their debt level so that it does not exceed the optimal debt threshold. Furthermore, MREITs managers could 
choose to use debt financing to maintain their investment needs on the optimal path and to ensure the smoothness of business 
operations, however, it is imperative that their decision should not violate the constraint of debt (Lambrecht & Myers 2014). 
In this light, MREITs need to focus on the optimal level of leverage and only accept the risk or constraint of debt when the 
chances of investment success are high, rather than prioritizing the desire to expand in their property investment portfolio 
over the optimal debt level.  
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Exhibit 1 
 
    M-REIT Debt ratio For 2005 to 2014           
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Axis REIT (Islamic) 34.26 33.38 35.51 24.11 34.94 34.64 31.74 36.10 21.40 11.94 
Al-AqarKPJ REIT (Islamic) 48.09 48.79 49.34 50.04 47.26 45.28 35.25 27.71 27.71  - 
Al-Hadharah Boustead REIT (Islamic)*  -  - 14.33 14.19 10.66 11.05 11.28  -  -  - 
AmanahHartaTanah PNB 20.25 12.35 8.74 5.99 0.62  -  -  -  -  - 
Amanah Raya REIT 37.40 40.29 38.10 38.31 39.58 36.78 36.83 34.60  -  - 
AmFirst REIT 35.99 32.76 33.19 46.29 39.46 39.65 39.59 46.12 12.74  - 
Atrium REIT 28.51 29.19 31.15 33.13 27.51 27.74 27.74 27.93  -  - 
Capita Malls Malaysia Trust 29.64 29.31 29.35 29.53 34.64    -  -  - 
Hektar REIT 41.44 41.07 41.93 42.87 44.08 45.23 41.98 32.37  -  - 
IGB REIT 24.84 25.25 25.68  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Pavilion REIT 15.92 17.03 17.53 19.74  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Quill Capita Trust 36.17 36.81 36.83 37.29 37.42 38.46 38.53 16.29  -  - 
Sunway REIT 31.45 31.33 33.56 35.54  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Starhill REIT 49.71 55.75 10.73 35.72 15.97 11.55 14.08 14.09 15.63  - 
Tower REIT 17.30 17.77 17.73 19.17 19.60 19.09 19.73 24.60 26.40  - 
UOA REIT 35.55 35.44 35.78 37.33 28.15 22.50 23.50 14.99 18.91 26.04 
 
